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Abstract
Are there productivity spillovers from FDI to domestic firms, and, if so, how much
should host countries be willing to pay to attract FDI?  To examine these questions we
use a plant-level panel covering U.K. manufacturing from 1973 through 1992.  Across a
wide range of specifications, we estimate a significantly positive correlation between a
domestic plant’s TFP and the foreign-affiliate share of activity in that plant’s industry.
This is consistent with positive FDI spillovers.  We do not generally find significant
effects on plant TFP of the foreign-affiliate share of activity in that plant’s region.
Typical estimates suggest that a 10 percentage-point increase in foreign presence in a
U.K. industry raises the TFP of that industry’s domestic plants by about 0.5 percent.  We
also use these estimates to calculate the per-job value of these spillovers.  These
calculated values appear to be less than per-job incentives governments have granted in
recent high-profile cases, in some cases several times less.
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1.  Introduction
An important part of globalization in recent years has been the ongoing rise in foreign direct
investment (FDI).  UNCTAD (2000) reports that from 1979 to 1999, the ratio of world FDI stock
to world gross domestic product rose from 5% to 16% and the ratio of world FDI inflows to
global gross domestic capital formation rose from 2% to 14%.  One consequence is that an
increasing share of countries’ output is accounted for by foreign affiliates of multinational firms.
The foreign-affiliate share of world production is now 15% in manufacturing and other tradables
(Lipsey, et al, 1998).
An obvious policy issue for governments is whether incentives should be offered to
multinational firms to induce local affiliate production.  In recent decades dozens of countries
have altered laws to at least grant multinationals national treatment, if not to favour these firms
via policies such as subsidies and tax breaks (UNCTAD, 2000).
1  Policy promotion of FDI is
now common not just in developing countries but in many developed countries as well.  The
exact values of FDI incentive packages are typically hard to know, but the values of many well-
known FDI packages appear very high.  In the late 1980s the U.S. state of Kentucky offered
Toyota an incentive package worth (in present value) $125-$147 million for a plant planning to
employ 3,000 workers (Black and Hoyt, 1989).  In 1994 the state of Alabama offered Mercedes
an incentive package of approximately $230 million for a new plant planning to employ 1,500
workers (Head, 1998).  In 1991 Motorola was paid £50.75 million to locate a mobile-phone plant
in Scotland, employing 3,000 workers.  The factory closed in 2001, and Motorola paid back
£16.75 million in grants.  Siemens was offered £50 million in 1996 to locate a 1000-worker
semiconductor plant in Tyneside, in Northeast England.  The factory closed 18 months later, at
which point Siemens had to repay £18 million in grants.
Is there economic justification for this kind of policy promotion?  There would be if the
social returns to FDI exceed the private returns.  One often-claimed possibility is that inward FDI
raises the productivity of domestic plants by bringing new knowledge into the host country that
is, at least partly, a public good.  This positive externality of knowledge spillovers may arise
along industry and/or regional lines.
                                                     
1 For example, as Aitken and Harrison (1998) document, before 1989 foreign firms in Venezuela were taxed at a higher rate than
domestic firms (50% versus 35%), were forced to repatriate profits at officially fixed exchange rates and could not enjoy
confidentiality privileges in joint ventures.  See Hanson (2001) for an overview of issues involved in FDI policy.2
There are thus two empirical questions that we seek to shed light on in this paper.  First, are
there productivity spillovers from FDI to domestic firms?  Second, if so, how much should host
countries be willing to pay to attract FDI?  Despite the public interest and policy importance of
these two questions, there is very little empirical evidence offering answers.
Existing evidence on whether there are productivity spillovers is of three types.  The first are
case studies.  Cases can offer rich description about episodes and exemplify general issues, but
do not always offer quantitative information and do not easily generalize.  Second, there are
industry-level studies (e.g., Caves, 1974; Blomstrom, 1986; and Driffield, 2000).  Many have
documented a positive industry-level correlation between FDI inflows and productivity.
However, the causal meaning of this correlation is unclear.  It may be that inward FDI raises
host-country productivity via spillovers.  But it may also be that inward FDI raises host-country
productivity by forcing the exit of low-productivity domestic plants, or simply by raising the
market share of foreign firms who are, on average, more productive.  Or it may be that
multinationals tend to concentrate in high-productivity industries.  This latter interpretation is
consistent with recent “knowledge-capital” models of multinational firms, in which these firms
generate knowledge assets that can be deployed in different countries (e.g., Carr, et al, 2001).
The third set of studies are micro-level analyses.  These studies examine whether the
productivity of domestic plants (or firms) is correlated with FDI presence in the industry and/or
region of the domestic plants.  Of the few micro-level studies we are aware of, only one finds
any evidence of positive spillovers.  Haddad and Harrison (1993) find increased industry-level
FDI is correlated with lower domestic-plant productivity in Moroccan manufacturing plants.
Aitken and Harrison (1999) find the same negative result for Venezuelan manufacturing.  They
suggest these negative spillovers reflect adverse effects of FDI due to competition and further
that FDI spillovers might not be positive in developing countries whose firms do not have the
absorptive capacity.  Chung, et al (1998) find that Japanese automobile firms operating in the
United States did not boost the productivity of their American component-supplier firms via
technology spillovers.  Girma and Wakelin (2001) look at one industry, U.K. electronics, and
find a positive correlation between domestic-firm productivity and regional Japanese FDI.
2
                                                     
2 Using data not on firms or plants but rather data on patent citations, Branstetter (2001) looks for spillovers of Japanese FDI into
the United States.  Subsequent to our work in this paper, Harris and Robinson (2001) look for spillovers in a collection of 20
detailed U.K. industries.  In footnote 21 we compare our methods with theirs.3
To bring some fresh evidence to bear on this issue, we use a plant-level panel for all U.K.
manufacturing from 1973 through 1992, where each plant reports information on nationality of
ownership.  Our main innovation is that we are, to the best of our knowledge, the first paper to
study FDI spillovers using plant-level data spanning the entire manufacturing sector of a
developed country.  The U.K. is of interest for a number of reasons.  First, by virtue of being a
high-income country that is among the top-five R&D producers in the world (Keller, 2001), there
is ex ante reason to suppose that it has sufficient absorptive capacity to realize FDI spillovers.
Second, in recent decades the U.K. has seen substantial inflows of FDI.  In our panel the foreign-
affiliate share of manufacturing employment has risen from 12% in 1973 to 23% in 1992.  Third,
in recent years the U.K. government has spent hundreds of millions of pounds in incentives for
foreign firms both to locate in the U.K. and to expand existing U.K. production.  With estimates
of spillovers, we can undertake some simple calculations to evaluate these actual government
outlays.
3
We study whether domestically owned plants are more productive when foreign-owned
plants are present.  Our general approach will be to regress domestic plant-level output on
domestic plant-level inputs, measures of foreign presence in the plant’s industry and region, and
other control regressors.  We interpret coefficient estimates on our FDI regressors as evidence
consistent with spillovers from inward FDI to domestic-plant total-factor productivity (TFP).  As
we will discuss, this rich data set raises a number of estimation issues regarding endogeneity,
measurement, and selection.  We will exploit the panel nature of our data in various ways to try
to address these issues and thereby gauge the robustness of our results.  In addition, we will
examine if FDI spillovers vary across dimensions including absorptive capacity of domestic
plants and nationality of foreign investors.
Our main finding is evidence consistent with FDI spillovers along industry lines.  Across a
wide range of specifications, on our full sample we estimate a significantly positive correlation
between a domestic plant’s TFP and the foreign-affiliate share of activity in that plant’s industry.
Typical estimates suggest that a 10 percentage-point increase in foreign presence in a U.K.
industry raises the TFP of that industry’s domestic plants by about 0.5 percent.  We estimate this
                                                     
3 The Appendix describes how the U.K. government subsidizes inward FDI.  In general, the government offers incentives to
many types of foreign-affiliate activity deemed worthy, where employment protection/expansion is a prominent criterion.
Between 1985 and 1988, 58% of Regional Selective Assistance (RSA, the major source of U.K. government support for firms)
went to plant expansions and 25% to new plants, and foreign firms received 60% of the value of RSA (PA Consultants, 1993,
Tables 2.3 and11.1, respectively).4
TFP/foreign-affiliate correlation to be stronger for plants that are smaller, less technologically
advanced, and less skill intensive, suggesting that spillovers accrue predominantly to “lagging”
domestic plants, not “leading” ones.  We also find this correlation to be stronger for U.S. and
French FDI, suggesting different spillover potentials for different parent countries.  We find no
significant correlation between plant TFP and FDI presence by region.
We then use our typical estimates of FDI spillovers to calculate the amount by which an
additional foreign job in a U.K. industry boosts the output of domestic plants in that industry.
This amount is about £2000 per year at 1992 prices.  We then compare these spillover benefits
with the per-job incentives governments have granted in several recent high-profile cases.  The
spillover magnitudes appear to be less than actual per-job incentives, in some cases several times
less.  This suggests that productivity spillovers alone might not justify some of the recent high-
profile policy initiatives.
There are five sections to the rest of the paper.  Section 2 briefly discusses the theory of
productivity spillovers.  Section 3 discusses our data, measurement, and estimation issues.
Section 4 presents our empirical findings, and Section 5 discusses their public-finance
implications.  Section 6 concludes.
4
2.  Multinationals and Theories of Productivity Spillovers
Many standard models of multinational firms assume they possess knowledge assets (e.g.,
patents, proprietary technology, trademarks, etc.) that can be deployed in plants outside the
parent country.  This knowledge aspect of multinationals is a key feature of recent general-
equilibrium models such as Carr, et al (2001) and earlier work such as Dunning’s (1981) “OLI”
framework, in which a necessary condition for a firm to become multinational is that it possess
an “ownership advantage” over some mobile knowledge asset.  This knowledge-asset view is
supported empirically.  For example, multinationals are much more R&D-intensive than are
purely domestic firms (e.g., Griffiths, 1999).
If multinationals transfer knowledge from parents to their foreign affiliates, then it is possible
that some of this knowledge “spills over” to domestic firms in the host country through non-
                                                     
4 Beyond knowledge spillovers, foreign presence may raise aggregate U.K. productivity by inducing exit of domestic firms
and/or by exerting competitive pressure on domestic firms.  Our focus on knowledge spillovers is for surviving domestic plants,
but we consider foreign presence when addressing selection issues.  We also try to control for competitive pressures.  Relatedly,
our analysis is only for domestic plants, and does not address the relative performance of foreign and domestic plants (e.g.,
Griffith, 1999; Oulton, 2000; Harris, 2001).5
market transactions.  The general idea that interaction among firms can generate spillovers dates
back to at least Marshall (1920).  Mansfield and Romeo (1980) present survey evidence in which
U.S. multinationals reported the frequency and pace at which their technology deployed in
foreign affiliates reached host-country competitors, all evidence consistent with multinational
spillovers.
Theoretical work on the mechanics of spillovers ranges from general discussions, often
leavened with anecdotes, to formal general-equilibrium models.  Broadly speaking, spillovers are
commonly hypothesized to fall along industry or regional lines.  An example of multinational
spillovers along industry lines is Rodriguez-Clare (1996), in which affiliates increase a host
country’s access to specialised varieties of intermediate inputs, the improved knowledge of
which raises the TFP of domestic producers.  Less formally, it is often hypothesized that
domestic firms learn from affiliates in the same industry via a range of informal contacts (e.g.,
trade shows; supplier/distributor discussions; exposure to affiliate products, marketing, and
patents; technical support from affiliates; reverse engineering).
Other spillover mechanisms may operate along regional lines.  One commonly proposed
avenue (since at least Marshall, 1920) is via labor turnover.  If at least some of the knowledge
particular to foreign affiliates is embodied in their labor force, then as affiliate employees leave
to work for domestic firms this knowledge may move as well.  For example, Song, et al (2001)
use U.S. patent records to trace the movement of scientists between domestic and foreign firms
(also see Motta, et al, 1999, and Moen, 2000).  This knowledge need not be firm-specific (e.g.,
inventory-control or management techniques).  If inter-regional labor mobility within a country
is low, then these spillovers are likely to be concentrated within regions where the affiliates
operate rather than dispersed country-wide.  More generally, regional labor-market spillovers can
be thought of as one important kind of agglomeration economy that can induce firms to locate
near each other in space.  Krugman (1991) offers some formal models of agglomeration issues.
Overall, then, there is reason to suppose that inward FDI may boost the productivity of
domestic plants either along industry lines or along regional lines.  Accordingly, we plan to
investigate both empirically by looking for a correlation between domestic-plant productivity6
and industry and regional measures of foreign-plant presence.  Such a correlation we will
interpret as evidence consistent with the presence of productivity spillovers.
5
3.  Data, Measurement, and Econometrics
3a.  Overview of the ARD Data Set
Details of our data can be found in Griffith (1999), Oulton (1997), Disney, et al (2000), and
the Data Appendix.  Here we briefly set out the main features of the data, and concentrate on
issues involved in calculating productivity and foreign presence.
Our main data set is the ARD (Annual Census of Production Respondents Database), which
is the micro-data underlying the U.K. Census of Production.  The basic unit on the ARD is a
production facility at a single mailing address, which corresponds to a “production unit” or
“plant.”  Each unit is assigned a unique identification number, which allows units to be linked
over time into a panel.  Units also have another identification number corresponding to the firm
who owns them, where units under common ownership share the same firm identifier.
To maintain the ARD data, the Office for National Statistics (or ONS, previously the Central
Statistical Office, or CSO) maintains a register of businesses designed to capture the universe of
production-sector activity.  The register is drawn from a variety of sources including historical
records, tax returns and other surveys.
6  This register is the basis upon which the Census forms
are sent out, response to which is mandatory under the 1947 Statistics of Trade Act.  These forms
request extensive operational information on inputs and outputs, which as discussed below we
use to estimate productivity.  Crucially for our purposes, the ONS also collects information on
plants’ industry, region, and nationality of ownership.
In at least two ways, the U.K. government has reduced the reporting burden on firms.  First,
it has not required all smaller plants to fill out Census forms.  Each year, all plants with
employment over some minimum size (100 in most years) are sampled.  Plants with employment
below this threshold are sampled with probabilities decreasing in size:  in most years, 50% of
plants with employment from 50 to 100 are sampled, and 25% of plants with employment from
                                                     
5 If multinational firms are aware of their ability to generate spillovers, then their operational decisions may be endogenous to
this possibility—e.g., they may attempt to minimize spillovers’ benefits to competitors.  Evidence consistent with this appears in
Mansfield and Romeo (1980), where the age of technology transferred to affiliates varies with mode of foreign entry, and in
Shaver and Flyer (2000), where larger foreign firms are found to be less likely to build U.S. plants near other competitors.  See
our discussion below for our treatment of endogeneity; other discussion of these issues appears in Kugler (2001).
6 Thus, for example, the 1983 Value Added Tax Act allowed the CSO to start using VAT information in compiling the register.
In 1994, the CSO moved to a completely new register.  See Perry (1985) for details on the ARD’s sampling methods.7
20 to 50.  The very smallest plants each year are excluded from the Census.  Thus, each year’s
sample consists of a mix of larger plants sampled with certainty and smaller plants sampled with
varying probabilities.  The sampled plants altogether are referred to as the “selected sample,”
while all non-sampled plants constitute the “non-selected sample.”  Each year the selected
sample accounts for around 90% of total U.K. manufacturing employment (Oulton, 1997).
A second reporting-burden issue is that multi-plant firms have some latitude in the level of
aggregation at which they report plant information.  If a multi-plant firm considers some of its
individual plants to be too small to complete a full Census form, it may report an amalgamation
of plants.  This reporting level is called an “establishment.”
Computerized ARD records go back to 1972; paper records for earlier years have been
destroyed.  In 1993 and 1994, a complete recoding of identification numbers was undertaken that
has generated non-trivial problems in matching plants before and after.  Thus, our data run
through 1992, a period which fortunately covered a substantial increase in FDI inflows.
The ARD structure raises many issues for our data analysis.  Here we highlight two, with
these and additional issues—e.g., sample selection—addressed more in the next sub-section.
First is the level of aggregation at which to investigate productivity spillovers.  In principle, the
ARD panel can be configured for plants, establishments, or firms.  However, at the level of
firms, spillovers might be obscured for multi-plant firms in multiple regions and/or industries.
And since multi-plant firms that aggregate operations into establishments do not report data for
each separate plant, at the level of plants we cannot measure TFP for all observations.
Accordingly, we choose to work at the level of establishments, which is the most-disaggregated
level at which we can measure TFP.  For brevity, we will use the terms establishments and plants
interchangeably.  That said, it is important to remember that because of firms’ reporting latitude,
ARD establishments can consist of more than one plant.  We will check the robustness of our
estimation results to this.
A second issue is what information, if any, can be used from the non-selected data.  Since
these businesses are not sent a full Census form, we have no information on their inputs (such as
material and investment).  They do report on nationality of ownership.  The ONS imputes their
employment levels using turnover data from tax records.  The ONS does check employment for
plants with imputed employment of over 11.  However, due to time lags in the provision of tax
data and processing of imputations, such information is typically refers to data from two years8
earlier (Perry, 1985).  In addition, these checked plants are only around 20% of the non-selected
sample.  In sum, we cannot use the non-selected data for productivity calculations.  But we could
potentially use the employment data to measure foreign presence and/or to weight the selected
sample.  We address both these issues below.
Finally, before our analysis we cleaned the data via extensive checks for nonsense
observations, outliers, coding mistakes, and the like.  This task is important in itself, but takes on
additional significance for any analysis on time-differenced data, as differencing tends to
magnify the role of measurement error.  For example, plant identification numbers are supposed
to die with the plant, so we deleted any observations where plant identifiers returned after
dropping out of the entire data set.
7  We dropped publicly owned plants (mainly in utilities), and
plants that seemed to change ownership, industry, or region in unusual fashion.  Finally, when
running regressions we deleted plants in the top and bottom percentiles of changes in all plant-
specific output and input variables.
3b.  Specification, Measurement, and Estimation Issues
Specification
To investigate whether inward FDI generates productivity spillovers for domestic plants, we
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In (1), subscripts i, t, k, R and I denote plant, time, lag length, region, and industry; α, γ, and δ
are parameters to be estimated; and the superscript d denotes that plants are domestically owned.
Output of domestic plants is denoted Y
d, their inputs denoted INPUT
d, foreign presence in the
region and industry FORR and FORI, Z
d are other control regressors, and ε is an unobserved
influence on domestic plant productivity.  Thus (1) is a production function for domestic plants,
augmented by measures of foreign presence and other controls, where coefficient estimates on
the non-input regressors capture their contribution to TFP.  As written in (1), these estimates are
the same across all panel dimensions; in our robustness checks we relax this in various ways.
                                                     
7 A plant might truly do this if it happens not to be sampled for full Census information for some period because of its small size,
but we can check on this using the plant records for those who do not fill out the full Census form.9
An alternative strategy to (1) would be to calculate TFP using data on outputs, inputs, and
input-cost shares, and then regress calculated TFP on the non-input regressors in (1).  In our
robustness checks we report results from this alternative.
As in all micro-level empirical work with production functions, we face important concerns
involving measurement and also estimation.  We discuss each of these issues in turn, with
additional measurement discussion in the Data Appendix.
8
Measurement
Output is measured as gross output.  For INPUT we use capital, K; production and non-
production labour, L
U and L
S (for unskilled and skilled); materials, M; and hours, h.  L
U, L
S and
M are available directly from the Census full-form surveys. L
U and L
S count employment of both
part-time and full-time workers, and M measures the value of both energy and non-energy
materials purchases.  Hours are available only at the two-digit industry level.  Output and
materials are deflated using industry-level price indexes as detailed as possible.
9  The ARD does
not ask plants to report capital stocks, so we used plant investment data to calculate capital
stocks.  We chose industry-level starting capital-stock values and depreciation rates for
buildings, plant and machinery, and vehicles taken from O’Mahony and Oulton (1990).  We
deflated each component of investment by ONS industry-year investment deflators.  We
experimented with different capital-stock computations (the two main variables affecting the
capital-stock path are starting values and depreciation rates), but these did not overly affect the
results.
The FORR and FORI terms in equation (1) are foreign presence by region and by industry.
Nationality of plant ownership is defined according to whether an overseas investor has an
effective voice in the management of the enterprise, where an effective voice is taken as
equivalent to a holding of 20% or more in the foreign enterprise.  In our data, then, foreign-
affiliate plants are those plants owned at least 20% by an overseas business interest.  Note that
beyond this 20% cut-off, the ARD does not measure the degree of foreign ownership.  Also note
that domestic plants mix both U.K.-headquartered multinational firms and purely domestic U.K.
plants, as the ARD does not provide any ownership distinction among domestically owned
                                                     
8 See Bartelsman and Doms (2000) for a detailed discussion of data issues specific to micro-level data sets.
9 Our lack of plant-level prices is a pervasive problem in the literature on micro panels.  To preview our interest in the correlation
between foreign presence and productivity, if inward FDI lowers industry prices then there may be a spurious correlation
between foreign presence and our measure of plant productivity.  Without plant-level prices we cannot assess the importance of
this effect.  But if it were important, then all plant-level studies should automatically find this correlation.10
plants.  Despite these caveats, one important advantage of the ARD over similar data sets for
most other countries is that it reports nationality of ownership in every year.
10
Given this information on nationality of ownership, we measure FORR as the share of total
employment in region R accounted for by foreign-owned plants.  FORI is constructed
analogously, as the share of total employment in industry I accounted for by foreign-owned
plants.  There are several points to make regarding measurement of these important variables.
First, these shares capture the idea that what matters for spillovers is how prevalent
foreigners are in the domestic region or industry, scaling for the overall size of that industry or
region.  Other micro-level spillover studies have used share measures of foreign presence.
11  To
examine the separate role of each share’s two components, total foreign employment and total
employment, we also estimate specifications that decompose the shares.
Second, to construct the shares we prefer employment as the activity measure because many
spillover theories (Section 2) involve interpersonal contacts.  One obvious alternative is to use
capital, the other primary factor.  Another possibility is employment of a particular skill group.
More-skilled non-production workers might embody most of the spillovers, e.g., due to their
greater knowledge of technology innovations.  Or production workers might be those most
familiar with specific production techniques (e.g., leaner assembly-line operations) that boost
productivity.  Below, we report results for these alternatives.
Third, our baseline specifications measure FORR and FORI using plants in the ARD’s
selected sample.  As discussed in subsection 3a, we can also measure these shares using both the
selected and non-selected samples.  The trade-off is comprehensiveness against data quality.
The non-selected sample does cover around 10% of total U.K. manufacturing employment.  But
80% of the non-selected employment data are imputed, not reported, and thus introduce greater
measurement error into FORR and FORI.  Concern about this measurement error leads us to use
just the selected sample as our baseline.  In our robustness checks we report the alternative of
                                                     
10 In contrast, the widely used analogous U.S. data base, the Longitudinal Research Database, does not track nationality of
ownership.  The only year in which nationality information was merged in (from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis) was
1987 (see examination of this one year in Doms and Jensen, 1998).  For the countries providing information and data to the
current OECD micro-data project (Finland, Holland, France, U.S., U.K., Germany and Italy), nationality of ownership data is
missing for Germany, Holland, Italy, and the U.S.; the French data are incomplete; and only the U.K. and Finland have such data.
11 Different papers have used slightly different specifications of foreign presence, though.  For example, Aitken and Harrison
(1999) use FORI and also the interaction of foreign ownership in the same industry and region.  One advantage of separating our
foreign-presence measures by industry and region is that if spillovers along these different dimensions take different times, then
our separated terms can be entered with different lag lengths.  We tried various specifications with interacted measures, but these
were consistently insignificant.11
measuring foreign presence using employment from both the selected and non-selected samples.
Using the non-selected data also raises the estimation issue of weighting observations, as the
ARD is a size-based sample.  We address this below.
Fourth, as indicated in equation (1) we allow these foreign-presence measures to enter both
contemporaneously and with lags.  This is because although theory suggests that FDI spillovers
may take time to arise (e.g., labor turnover to domestic plants), there is not sharp empirical
evidence on this issue as to exactly how long.  Our specifications will try many lag structures.
12
Fifth, theory offers no sharp prediction as to how narrowly or broadly regions and industries
should be measured.  We distinguish 11 different U.K. regions.  These are commonly used
regions originally identified in the U.K. censuses of population, and they fall across conventional
political and other boundaries.  For FORI we distinguish 22 different manufacturing industries;
these are roughly comparable to two-digit Standard Industrial Classification industries for U.S.
manufacturing.  There was a major revision to the U.K. industry classifications in 1980.  These
reclassifications make it difficult to separate industries in greater detail with confidence, so to
minimize potential measurement error our baseline is to use the 22 two-digit industries.  This
practical issue aside, there may be reason to think industry-mediated spillovers are not “too
narrow”.  For example, inventory-management techniques in apparel production might apply to a
wide range of apparel goods—men’s, women’s, and children’s.  Or, as discussed in Section 2,
spillovers may arise from supplier and/or customer interactions—e.g., windshield producers
learning from automobile firms.
Table 1 reports some basic ownership information in our ARD panel.  As column 1 shows,
we have usable data on 13,000-23,000 plants per year.  Columns 2 and 3 show the bulk of those
are British owned, but column 4 shows that the fraction of manufacturing employment accounted
for by foreign affiliates grew from 12% in 1973 to 23% in 1992.  The general decline in the
number of British plants in Table 1 is consistent with the general decline during our sample
period in overall U.K. manufacturing activity.
13  Note that given how we construct FORR and
FORI, this decline will tend to increase our foreign-presence measures even if there is no change
                                                     
12 In Mansfield and Romeo’s (1980) surveys, U.S. multinationals report that their technology deployed in foreign affiliates
reached host-country competitors in anywhere from zero to over 6.5 years, with a modal response of 0.5 to 1.5 years and a mean
response of about four years.
13 Office of National Statistics (1998) reports that total U.K. manufacturing employment fell from 6.446 million in 1980 to 4.084
million in 1992.  There is a spike in the number of plants in 1984 and 1989 because the Central Statistical Office changed the
compilation method of the register (see Disney, et al, 2000).12
in FDI activity.  To control for this, we will estimate specifications that add to equation (1) the
lagged number of British plants by region and industry.  Entering separately the numerators and
denominators of FORR and FORI will also control for this.
Tables 2a and 2b show the regional and industrial variation, respectively, in foreign-
employment shares for 1977 and 1992.  By region, foreign presence was highest in the South
East in the 1970s, but by 1992 Wales was the highest.  By industry, foreign presence was
generally highest in office machinery, motor vehicles, and chemicals.  But the ranking of foreign
presence in regions and industries is not fixed, and the panel nature of our data allows us to
exploit this variation.
Turning to the control regressors Z in equation (1), one important set of controls is for
product-market competition.  There is now a large literature suggesting that competition affects
the productive efficiency (i.e., X-inefficiency) of firms (for a theory review see Vickers, 1995;
for empirical evidence see Nickell, 1996).  The idea that foreign competition through FDI can
exert competitive pressures has been both discussed and empirically analyzed in many studies
(e.g., Caves, 1974; Blomstrom, 1986; Chung, et al, 1998).  More generally, Baily and Solow
(2001) survey a wide range of micro evidence that international competition of many forms—
including both FDI and trade—spurs competitive responses in exposed firms.
It seems reasonable that the entry of foreign firms might raise the degree of competition and
hence the effort level that domestic firms must exert to remain viable.  This pro-competitive
effect might be regarded as a spillover effect, but the welfare consequences of this are different
from the knowledge spillovers that theory tends to focus on.  Knowledge spillovers are Pareto-
improving positive externalities, whereas increased effort represents a welfare transfer away
from the harder-working employees to shareholders and/or customers.  Hours is our only
possible effort measure thus far, so without direct controls for competition the coefficient on
FORI might reflect both knowledge spillovers and the effects of competition.  Indeed, Aitken and
Harrison (1999) ascribe their finding of negative spillovers to competition:  foreign entrants take
domestic firms’ market shares, and thereby force domestic incumbents up their average-cost
curves.  All this suggests the need to control for product-market competition.
14
                                                     
14 Note that including inputs in equation (1) should help control for the output consequences of plants moving along their
average-cost curves.  Also, it seems unlikely that manufacturing plants compete along regional lines.  This suggests that the
coefficients on FORR are unlikely to reflect increased effort.13
Following Nickell (1996), we use four potential measures of product-market competition:
industry concentration (CONCIt), import penetration (IMPORTIt), market share (MSHAREit) and
rents (RENTSit).  IMPORT is available at the industry-level as imports as a share of domestic
production.  MSHARE is measured as plant output as a proportion of four-digit-industry output.
15
This is unlikely to be a reliable cross-section measure of market power, since it is affected by
technological differences between industries (e.g., capital intensity) which also likely affect
productivity.  Accordingly, we use changes in market share, ∆MSHARE, to measure changes in
competitive pressure.  RENTS aims to capture ex ante rents potentially available to workers and
managers to take as increased leisure.  It is defined as sales less material, capital and labour
costs, expressed as a proportion of net output (where we measure labor cost using industry-
region average wages instead of actual plant wages).
Estimation Issues
One important estimation issue is endogeneity.  This is a particular concern for our key
regressors of interest, FORR and FORI.  Foreign firms may be attracted to regions and/or
industries with high-productivity domestic plants—e.g., perhaps learning spillovers flow in both
directions.  To address this possibility, we use lagged measures of FORR and FORI.  Above, we
argued that lags may be appropriate because spillovers take time to materialize.  Lagged foreign
presence is also predetermined relative to current plant productivities.  We also suspect that the
competition regressors may be endogenous:  e.g., higher plant efficiency might raise rents and
market share.  We therefore lag RENTS and ∆MSHARE by two years.
16
A second estimation issue is omission of unobserved variables.  There are likely to be a host
of plant, industry, time, and region-specific influences that are unobservable to the
econometrician but are known to the plant.  These unobservables might underlie any observed
correlation between productivity and foreign presence.  For example, sound infrastructure or
high-quality management might both raise domestic productivity and attract foreign firms.
We attempt to address this omitted-variables problem via time differencing and fixed effects.
First, we estimate (1) on time-differenced data.  In addition to removing any fixed plant-specific
                                                     
15 We also calculated market shares for three- and two-digit industries.  The coefficient standard error rose as we did this,
suggesting that the measure becomes increasingly inaccurate as we use a broader base, which is plausible.
16 The other obvious option would be to instrument for foreign presence, using some variable correlated with foreign presence
but uncorrelated with unobservable determinants of plant productivity.  In our data we know of no good candidates.  Government
policies (and changes therein) are one common candidate set of instruments.  We do have data since 1980 on U.K. government
support for firms by region, but this support was available for all firms—domestic and foreign, manufacturing and services.14
unobservable variation, differencing also removes fixed regional and industrial effects such as
indicators of global engagement (e.g., tariffs), infrastructure, technological opportunity.  One
well-known cost of differencing is that it can aggravate measurement error in the regressors, and
thereby introduce biases.  In a multivariate setting, the direction of the bias cannot be signed.
Longer time differences tend to attenuate this problem (Griliches and Hausman, 1986), so we
report results for one-year, three-year, and five-year differences.  Longer time differences may
also be more appropriate if spillovers take time to materialize.
Second, in our differenced specifications we also include full sets of time, industry, and
region fixed effects.  These additional fixed effects control for unobservables that may be driving
changes in key variables (e.g., we control not just for “Wales is an attractive region” but also for
“the attraction of Wales is rising over time,” or not just for “computers is a large industry” but
also for “computers is a booming industry”).  Thus, our findings rely not on differences in plant
productivity and differences in foreign presence but on the deviation of differences in plant
productivity and foreign presence from their year, region, and industry means.
If our differencing and fixed effects are sufficient, then in equation (1) the error term ε is left
uncontaminated by omitted variables.  This will not be the case, however, if there are important
unobservables that vary both across plants and over time.  For example, managerial talent may
not be fixed over time within plants.  Without measures of these plant-and-time-varying factors,
estimates from (1) may still be biased.  Olley and Pakes (1996) show that these remaining
unobservable shocks can be proxied from investment behavior, on the assumption that these
shocks influence current investment but, since investment takes time, not current output.  Olley
and Pakes (1996) implement their method on telecommunication plants, as does Pavcnik (2000)
on Chilean manufacturing plants.
As Griliches and Mairesse (1995) discuss, however, this structural approach depends on a
number of assumptions:  e.g., plants cannot undertake zero investment, other factors besides
capital fully adjust to shocks each period, and markets are perfectly competitive.  The sensitivity
of this approach to violations of assumptions is an ongoing research question.  For example,
Levinsohn and Petrin (2000) propose using intermediate inputs rather than investment to address
the underlying omitted-variables problem.  For our purposes, we prefer not to assume perfect15
competition in light of the emphasis in the micro-spillovers literature on the competitive effects
of foreign entrants.
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A third estimation issue is selection bias.  Plants can choose to exit each period, but our data
contains only the surviving plants.  This might bias our estimates for foreign presence.  Suppose
that foreign presence truly does boost domestic-plant productivity, and thereby domestic-plant
survival chances.  In regions and/or industries with low foreign presence, we will observe only
those plants whose unobservable offsetting benefits—e.g., good management—allow them to
survive.  But in regions and/or industries with high foreign presence, we are much more likely to
observe all plants.  This suggests that selection bias may understate the true relationship between
inward FDI and productivity.  Conversely, if firms with lower productivity growth are less likely
to survive when foreign presence is high, selection may overestimate the relationship between
inward FDI and productivity.  Therefore, the direction of the overall potential bias is unknown.
Our use of differencing and the like does not control for selection; in fact, longer time
differences may exacerbate it.  To gauge the robustness of our results to this, we estimate some
specifications adding to (2) a Heckman selection term, where the selection term is determined
using a probit of exit on a number of variables including our foreign-presence measures and a
polynomial in capital and investment.
18
A final estimation issue is weighting.  Since we have the selected and non-selected data, we
can construct sampling weights and run weighted regressions on the selected sample.  However,
there are at least two reasons why weighted regressions might be misleading.  One is that the true
marginal effects may differ across size groups.  As DuMouchel and Duncan (1983) show, only in
special cases do weighted regressions return an estimate of the average effect across groups.
19  A
second issue is that if the sampling weights are measured with error, then weighted least squares
                                                     
17 Girma and Wakelin (2001) analyze productivity spillovers using both a specification similar to ours and the Olley-Pakes
specification, and find that both approaches yield qualitatively identical results about spillovers.
18 Our exclusion restrictions for the selection equation include, as in Olley and Pakes (1996), the assumption that the investment
variables affect the entry/exit decision but not current output and thus productivity.  We also have a potential selection bias since
plants who have a downward employment shock are more likely to drop out of the ARD sample even though they have not truly
died.  If we were looking at employment this would mean that we would only see small plants with favourable characteristics, but
since we are looking at productivity it is not clear how the selection bias would operate.
19 DuMouchel and Duncan (1983) consider the following.  Suppose one is trying to estimate a marginal effect β between Y and
set of variables X, where the data has been sampled and weights wi are assigned to the ith observation.  The OLS estimator of β is
βOLS=(X′X)
-1X′Y.  The weighted least squares estimator is given by βWLS=(X′WX)
-1X′WY where W is a diagonal matrix whose
ith diagonal element is wi.  Suppose, however, that the β varies across size strata so that the model is Y=Xβ(j) + ε.  A marginal
effect of interest would be the weighted average marginal effect namely βAVG=Σwiβ(j)/ Σwi where the summation is over strata.
DuMouchel and Duncan (1983) show that βWLS is a biased estimate of βAVG (unless all the regressors are constant), and so there
is no reason to prefer weighting.  In fact βOLS is also biased, but there is no general result that one is less biased than another.16
can yield biased coefficient estimates.  This is a real concern, both because the precise details of
the sampling rules used by the ONS every year are no longer on record and because employment
in the non-selected data from which weights can be approximated is in most cases imputed.
Because of concerns about these complications, our baseline estimates all use unweighted
least squares.  When using the non-selected sample in measuring foreign presence, however, for
robustness we report results for weighted least squares as well, where the weights are constructed
using employment bands by year, region, and industry.
20
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Equation (2) includes our variables for inputs, foreign presence, competition, and time, regional,
and industry dummies (λt, λR, and λI).  We tried all the competition variables discussed above in
both levels and changes, but only those shown in (2) were consistently significantly different
from zero.  We now turn to our estimation results.
21
4.  Estimation Results
Baseline Results
Table 3 reports our baseline OLS estimates of equation (2) using short and long differences
in combination with various lag structures.  Each column reports a different difference length
                                                     
20 The size bands are based on the following employment intervals:  first less than 20; then eight intervals of 10 additional
workers up to 100 (i.e., 20-29, 30-39, etc.); 100-199; 200-299; 300-399; and 400 or larger.  The reason we include intervals for
plants over 100 workers is that for various reporting reasons, some of these observations actually appear in the non-selected data.
Although plants with less than 20 employees are not sampled, our data contain a few observations with less than 20 employees
(this may be because large firms may choose to report by small local units). We dropped these observations in our weighted
regressions because they would be given very large weights, which would exacerbate error in the weights.
21 For a sub-sample of 20 four-digit SIC industries in the ARD, Harris and Robinson (2001) estimate productivity equations
somewhat like equation (1).  Their industries include cement and plaster; preparation of milk products, cocoa, etc; and steel wire.
One important difference is their observations include plants in the non-selected sample, where the authors impute all unreported
output and inputs data for these observations based on the non-selected employment information.17
and lag structure, with robust standard errors reported below coefficient estimates.  Column 1
shows the simplest specification, namely, current FORR and FORI with one year differences.
Both coefficient estimates are positive, consistent with positive productivity spillovers from
foreign plants to domestic plants at both the regional and industry level, but the regional
coefficient is insignificantly different from zero.  The coefficient on FORI suggests that a rise of
10 percentage points in FORI for some industry, ceteris paribus, would raise output in each
domestic plant in that industry by about 0.5%.  Because we control for inputs in estimating (2),
this output increase is a TFP increase.
Since this magnitude is common to a number of the specifications we report below, it is
worth trying to put it in some context.  The observed rise in FORI over the sample period 1973-
1992 is about 11 percentage points.  By our estimates of the previous paragraph, this implies that
industry spillovers raised UK manufacturing industry TFP by about 0.5%.  Since actual TFP in
U.K. manufacturing rose by about 10% over the estimation period, our estimates suggest that
spillovers explain about 5% of the observed 1973-1992 rise in U.K. manufacturing TFP.
22
Returning to Table 3, column 2 shows both foreign-presence measures dated t-2 and t-3,
which are predetermined relative to the differenced dependent variable.
23  The second lag of
FORI is positive and the most significant. While both lags of FORR are positive, neither is very
significant.  To see the magnitude of the overall effects across all lags, two lower rows also
report the sum of the individual coefficients for the industry (ΣFORI) and region (ΣFORR).  The
P-value for the joint significance of the summed coefficients is reported in the next two rows,
entitled P(ind) and P(reg).  We see that the net industry effect is about the same magnitude as in
column 1, and remains significant.  The net regional effect is larger than in column 1, but
remains insignificant.
Column 3 reports a specification using all lagged terms.  Looking at the P-values, the
regional effects are again jointly insignificant whereas the industrial effects are jointly
significant.  The net regional effect is now larger than in columns 1 and 2.  The net industrial
effect is smaller, apparently because of a negative but insignificant (t-3) effect.
                                                     
22 To undertake this calculation, we needed to calculate total manufacturing TFP in a manner consistent with the regression from
which we use the coefficients for FORI.  We do this by subtracting from the change in log real output the weighted changes in the
logs of K, M, S, U and H with the weights being the coefficients taken from estimates of (2).
23 We also experimented with lags dated four years and beyond, but they were not significant.18
Columns 4 to 6 set out the three-year differences, and columns 7-9 the five-year differences.
Comparing columns 4 and 7 with column 1, the results are similar:  a significantly positive
coefficient on FORI, with about the same magnitude as column 1, and an insignificant coefficient
on FORR.  Columns 5 and 8, using the (t-2) and (t-3) lags, also give similar results, with a
coefficient of around 0.05 for FORI.  Finally, columns 6 and 9 both give jointly insignificant
effects for FORR and significant effects for FORI.  It is also worth noting that the longer
differences raise slightly the coefficients on FORI.  This is consistent with the theory discussed
earlier about measurement error and length of differences.
Taken together, the results in Table 3 suggest that industry-mediated productivity spillovers
are positive and significant, with a semi-elasticity of 0.05 as our central estimate.  Applied to
actual data on foreign presence and TFP, this semi-elasticity suggests that spillovers explain
about 5% of the actual rise in U.K. manufacturing TFP over our sample period.  Our estimates of
spillover effects along regional lines are less consistent.  These estimates are generally positive,
but are also mostly insignificantly different from zero.
These are our basic results.  Tables 4 and 5 next show a set of extensions, first of splitting our
data by groups of plants and second of decomposing foreign presence by country.  Table 6 then
shows a large number of robustness checks for various measurement and estimation issues.
Extension:  Spillovers by Absorptive Capacity
It has been argued that the ability of domestic plants to realize FDI spillovers might depend
on their absorptive capacity.  Absorptive capacity may have something to do with the overall
level of economic development in the host country.  For example, in discussing their inability to
find any FDI spillovers among Venezuelan plants, Aitken and Harrison (1999, p. 617) conjecture
that “the economy [might] not [be] sufficiently developed or diversified, to receive large benefits
from foreign presence.”  If there is indeed some minimum level of development countries need
to realize spillovers, conditional on a country reaching that level there may also be variation in
absorptive capacity among domestic plants due to differences in plant size, skill intensity, or
technological sophistication.  Perhaps only the “best practice” plants can take advantage of FDI
spillovers.  Conversely, perhaps best-practice plants, by definition, have already implemented
foreign ideas and methods, such that spillovers accrue mainly to other plants with more to learn.
There is no obvious single measure of a plant’s absorptive capacity.  We proxy for it by
splitting our sample into three groups based on their location in the distribution of three different19
performance measures:  total employment, TFP, and skill intensity (i.e., non-production share of
total employment).  Consider the example of employment.  Within each industry-year, we
separated all plants into three groups based on their total plant employment:  those below the 25
th
percentile, those between the 25
th and 75
th percentile, and those above the 75
th percentile.  Note
that we separate by industry and by year, which accounts for cross-industry variation in total
employment due to factors like underlying technology differences.  We pool across all industry-
years to obtain our three sub-samples, and then estimate (2) separately on each sub-sample.  This
process was repeated for our TFP and skill-intensity performance measures.  The three different
criteria seemed to generate broadly similar sub-samples, consistent with the micro evidence from
several countries that best-practice plants appear as such along several dimensions.
24
Table 4 reports our estimation results for these various sub-samples, using the same
specification as in column 1 of Table 3.  There are two features of note.  First, the results are
consistent with Table 3 in that FORI is generally positive and significant and FORR insignificant.
Second, there is a suggestion that spillovers are somewhat larger at lower points in the
performance distribution.  For all three performance measures, the coefficient on FORI is
insignificant and small for the best-practice plants above the 75
th percentile.  For the lower two
groups in the distribution, for all three performance measures the coefficient on FORI is larger
and is near or above standard significance levels.  These differences we consider to be
suggestive, as pairwise F-tests show the coefficients on FORI to be significantly different (at the
10% level) in only two of the nine possible comparisons:  within the skill-intensity distribution,
between plants above the 75
th percentile and those between the 25
th and 75
th percentiles and
between plants above the 75
th percentile and those below the 25
th percentile.  Overall, we think
Table 4 offers suggestive evidence consistent with the hypothesis that FDI spillovers accrue
predominantly to plants further away from the best-practice frontier.
25
                                                     
24 Since employment in any year may be measured with error, in making the rankings we averaged employment in year t over
years (t-1) and (t-2).
25  One explanation of Table 4’s patterns may be that the best-practice centiles contain most of the U.K.-headquartered
multinationals.  Recall that our ARD sample has no way to separate U.K.-owned plants between those that are part of U.K.-
headquartered multinationals and those that are part of purely domestic U.K. firms.  If U.K. multinationals have little to learn
from other multinationals, then this might help explain Table 4.  Also, note that across the three different absorptive-capacity
metrics in Table 4, each centile range does not contain the exact same number of plants because the extent of missing data varies
across these metrics.20
Extension:  Spillovers by Nationality of Foreign Ownership
Since the ARD reports the country of ownership of foreign plants, we can examine variation
in spillovers with nationality.  We are particularly interested in inward FDI from the world’s
other high-R&D countries:  the United States, France, Germany, and Japan.
Table 5 reports estimation results where FORR and FORI are constructed for each country
separately.  As with earlier tables, regional effects remain generally insignificant.  For industry
effects, our estimates are consistent with significantly positive spillovers from U.S. and French
FDI, insignificant spillovers from German FDI, and significantly negative spillovers from
Japanese FDI.  The U.S. finding is consistent with both aggregate and micro-level evidence that
the United States is at or near the world technology frontier.
26  And the overall ranking of the
four countries is strikingly consistent with Doms and Jensen (1998, Table 7.6).  Looking at
foreign affiliates in the United States, they find that relative to U.K. plants French plants have
higher TFP, German plants have about the same TFP, and Japanese plants have lower TFP.
27
Robustness Checks
To verify the robustness of our main results we performed a large number of checks.  Table 6
reports ten important checks, all using the column 1, Table 3 specification of contemporaneous
foreign-presence measures and one-year time differences.  It is important to note that many
robustness checks were estimated for a wide range of specifications, but that we report just one
specification for brevity.  In many cases this one specification actually yields weaker results than
others not reported; we will highlight some important instances.
The first five columns of Table 6 involve checks on measurement of our key foreign
presence regressors, FORR and FORI.  Column 1 addresses what activity is used to calculate
foreign presence.  In Section 3 we argued that employment is our baselines measure of foreign-
affiliate presence, but other options include capital stocks or employment by skill group.
Column 1 reports estimation results measuring FORR and FORI using non-production
employment.  As before, industry effects are significant but region effects are not.  Qualitatively
                                                     
26 An example of country-level comparisons is Davis and Weinstein (2001).  At the micro-level, Doms and Jensen (1998)
document that parents of U.S. multinationals are more productive than U.S. affiliates of foreign-owned multinationals.
27  One interpretation of the large negative coefficient estimate for Japanese presence might be that Japanese firms exert
particularly strong competitive pressures that our competition regressors do not fully capture.  To test this idea we examined the
industry distribution of Japanese FDI; over our sample period, about two-thirds of all Japanese employment in the U.K. was in
electrical and electronic engineering.  Excluding this industry from our measure of Japanese FDI presence reduced our coefficient
estimate somewhat (to –0.183), but did not reduce it to zero.21
identical results were obtained using production employment or capital, all of which reflects the
high sample correlations in levels and in differences among these different variables.
28
Columns 2 and 3 introduce the non-selected sample into the analysis.  In column 2, we
measure FORR and FORI using not just the selected sample but also the non-selected sample as
well.  Industry effects remain significant, with the slight decline in the coefficient estimate
consistent with attenuation bias due measurement error in the imputed employment values in the
non-selected sample.  This slight decline generally disappears for alternative specifications with
lagged regressors and/or longer time differences, so we regard the industry results to be entirely
robust to this measurement issue.
29
In column 3 we again use the non-selected sample to measure foreign presence; we also use
weighted rather than ordinary least squares as outlined in Section 3b.  As in column 2, there is
little evidence of spillovers along regional lines.  The industry coefficient estimate is virtually
unchanged from column 2, albeit now insignificant at standard levels.  This decline in
significance may reflect problems with measurement error in the sampling weights, discussed
earlier.  We note that this particular specification of WLS actually gives among the weakest
evidence of industry spillovers.  Weighted estimates from alternative specifications with lagged
regressors and/or longer time differences—including those that omit the smallest plants, as
discussed earlier—almost all yield larger, more significant industry coefficient estimates.
30
Our baseline measures of FORR and FORI are disaggregated between their numerators and
denominators in column 4.  This is to check that foreign presence matters in absolute levels as
well as in shares.  This appears to be the case.  The coefficient estimate for total foreign
employment by industry is significantly positive, while that for total foreign employment by
region is basically zero.  As discussed earlier (see Table 1), one reason to worry about
differences between employment levels and shares might be the generally declining number of
British plants over our sample period.  To control for this directly, column 5 returns to using
foreign-presence shares but adds regressors controlling both for the number of British plants by
                                                     
28 For example, the skilled-labor and unskilled-labor activity measures have sample correlations in levels and in differences
(three-year and five-year) that range from 0.81 to 0.97.  Because of these very high correlations, multicollinearity problems
inhibit attempts to enter both employment measures in the same regression to see if one employment group matters more.
29 For example, the specification with contemporaneous regressors and five-year time differences yields a coefficient estimate on
FORI of 0.107 (t-statistic of 5.30) and on FORR of –0.052 (t-statistic of 1.64).
30 For example, the WLS specification with contemporaneous regressors and five-year time differences yields a coefficient
estimate on FORI of 0.087 (t-statistic of 3.08) and on FORR of –0.091 (t-statistic of 0.98).  For the analogous WLS specification
that excludes all plants with fewer than 20 employees, the coefficient on FORI is 0.110 (t-statistic of 4.45) and on FORR is –0.017
(t-statistic of 0.46).22
industry and for the number by region (with both controls lagged one year).  As column 5 shows,
accounting for declines in total U.K. employment has no substantive impact on our estimates of
the role of foreign presence by industry and region.
The second row of Table 6 addresses other measurement and estimation issues.  Column 6
reports results from re-estimating the baseline model correcting for selection using a Heckman
correction with the selection equation described earlier.  Our estimates on the foreign-presence
variables are qualitatively unchanged by performing this selection correction.  That said, the
Heckman diagnostic rho is –0.090, with a standard error of 0.010 and an implied χ
2(1) test
statistic of 84.60, which indicates correlation between the error terms in the selection and
productivity regressions and thus the potential for estimation bias if selection is ignored.  We
experimented with alternative specifications of the selection equation (e.g., dropping foreign
presence or adding inventories); our results were qualitatively unchanged.  We also re-estimated
all nine specifications of Table 4 using different selection-correction specifications, as selection
issues might be more important for particular sub-samples of our data.  We obtained very similar
selection-corrected coefficient estimates as those in Table 4, reinforcing its findings.
Column 7 reports results for a more-general specification of equation (2) in which we allow
the various α coefficients on inputs to vary across all two-digit industries (by interacting input
terms with industry dummies).  One might worry that the assumption of equal α coefficients is
not warranted, in a way that might bias our estimates for spillovers.  This does not appear to be
the case, however, as the coefficient estimates on FORR and FORI are very similar to the basic
results in Table 3.  Column 8 addresses a related specification issue; here, we modify our
estimation equation by dropping the input regressors and replacing the regressand with TFP
calculated from sample data on inputs, outputs, and cost shares.  Again, estimates are consistent
with positive spillovers from foreign industry presence but not regional presence.
The fact that some observations actually represent multi-plant establishments is addressed in
column 9.  Recall that this issue arises because firms are granted some latitude in completing
ONS Census forms.  To the extent that our data contain multi-plant establishments with
constituent plants spanning multiple industries or regions, then our foreign-presence measures
will contain some error relative to the ideal of fully separating out each plant.  This measurement
error might bias downward our baseline coefficient estimates; were this the case, our industry
results would be a lower-bound estimate of spillover magnitudes, but our regional results thus far23
might be obscuring true regional spillovers.  Column 9 estimates our baseline specification on
the sub-sample of single-plant establishments.  This group constitutes about two-thirds of our full
sample, broadly consistent with Oulton’s (1998) facts on this issue for the 1980s.  For this sub-
sample we continue to find estimates consistent with industry but not regional spillovers.
Finally, column 10 reports results for the sub-sample that excludes all plants located in
Wales.  As reported in Table 2a, Wales was one of the regions with the largest increase in
foreign presence during our sample period, and we wanted to check that our main results were
robust to excluding apparently important regions and/or industries.  As demonstrated by the
Wales exclusion, the results do seem robust in this way.
We also conducted other robustness checks that, for brevity, we do not report in Table 6.  For
example, as a further check on our industry estimates we excluded all observations that switched
industry (at our baseline two-digit level) in either 1979 or 1980, the period of the large
redefinition of industry classifications.  One additional issue we mention is there may be serial
correlation in the short-differenced residuals if there are short-run adjustments to shocks.  Long-
differencing the data is one possible treatment for smoothing out short-run shocks.  For our one-
year differences, we also added to equation (2) a lagged dependent variable and once-lagged
input variables.  We estimated this equation using the GMM method of Arellano and Bond
(1991).  The coefficient on ∆FORI, t was 0.054 (t=3.10) and on ∆FORR, t was 0.027 (t=1.15); the
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable was 0.37 (t=7.47), which implies a long-run effect
of FORI, t of 0.085.  The p value for the test of no MA(1) error in the residuals was zero, rejecting
the null of no autocorrelation, which is to be expected since first differencing should induce
MA(1) residual autocorrelation.  However, the p value for the test of no MA(2) error in the
residuals was 0.30, which fails to reject the null of no autocorrelation.  Thus, the test statistics
indicate this dynamic specification is acceptable.  In summary, we think our findings are robust
to more complicated dynamic specifications.
31
5.  Public-Finance Implications:  How Much Should Governments Pay To Attract FDI?
In the introduction we reported estimated costs of government FDI subsidies for several
high-profile cases in the United Kingdom and United States.  Tables 3 through 6 report our
                                                     
31 We also ran the same specification with ∆FORI, t-2, ∆FORI, t-3 and ∆FORR t-2, and ∆FORR, t-3.  Just as Table 3, column 2, the
coefficient on ∆FORI, t-2 was significantly positive (coefficient 0.080, t=4.15) with the other variables insignificant (and with p
values of zero and 0.16 for MA(1) and MA(2) autocorrelation, respectively).24
estimates of the spillover benefits to a host country from FDI.  In this sub-section we attempt
some calculations to compare these costs and benefits on a present-value, per-worker basis.  We
have in mind that subsidy costs are incurred at the start of a foreign plant’s life (and perhaps
thereafter as well), after which that plant delivers a flow of productivity-spillover benefits as
long as it continues to operate.  In performing the calculations, we reiterate the caveat that our
estimation results are best interpreted as suggestive evidence consistent with productivity
spillovers:  we perform these calculations assuming that spillovers actually do exist.
The subsidy costs per worker can be easily calculated given reports of subsidy values and
jobs covered.  However, it is important to note the uncertainty surrounding both these quantities,
as the reports are culled mainly from press reports without systematic verification of either
values or jobs involved.  For the four cases mentioned in the introduction, the costs per worker
(all expressed in 2000 U.K. pounds) are Siemens (UK) £35,417; Motorola (UK) £14,356; Toyota
(Kentucky, USA) £39,827; and Mercedes (Alabama, USA) £117,178.
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The subsidy benefits per worker arise from the TFP boost enjoyed by the affected domestic
plants thanks to the inward FDI.  Because our estimates of productivity spillovers are for each
year, they accumulate over the duration of foreign presence.  This means we need to calculate the
per year output boost for domestic plants per extra foreign job, and then discount these output
boosts over the length of that job.
Consider a foreign plant coming into a particular industry I.  If this new plant raises our
foreign-presence measure FORI by ∆φI, then the percentage rise in output in each domestic plant
in that industry is equal to (γ1)(∆φI), where (γ1) is the spillover coefficient in equation (1).  If the
initial output across all domestic plants in that industry is given by YIO
d, then the level rise in
domestic output in that industry, ∆YI




d gives the rise in output per rise in the foreign-employment share, ∆φI.  To transform this
into the rise per foreign worker, we need to calculate the relation between the rise in foreign
employment share, ∆φI, and the rise in foreign employment, ∆NI
 f.  This relation is given by
















f are the number of domestic and foreign jobs in the industry in the base
period.  The intuition behind this is as follows.  Recall that φI= (NIO
f)/(NIO
d+NIO
f).  Thus, an
increase in NIO
f raises both the numerator and denominator of φI.  This accounts for the two terms
on the right-hand side of (3).  The first term shows the direct effect on φI from ∆NI
  f via the
numerator of φI.  The second terms shows the effect on φI from ∆NI
 f via the denominator of φI.
The second term shows that the higher is foreign employment, the more is NIO
f/NIO
d and so the
less a given rise in NI
 f raises φI.
Combining (3) with the expression for ∆YI
d, we can write the extra domestic output per
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The extra domestic output per extra foreign job consists of four terms.  The first, γ1, is the
estimated coefficient from equation (1) that gives the percentage change in domestic-plant output
in response to a rise in foreign-employment share.  The second term in (4), YIO
d, converts this
percentage change into a level change.  The third and fourth terms convert the rise in foreign
employment share to rise in foreign employment in actual levels.
An expression similar to (4) would hold for productivity spillovers along regional lines, and
we could therefore calculate the extra domestic output in region per foreign job created in a
region.  Our estimates of regional productivity spillovers were mostly small and insignificant,
however, so we do not attempt any regional calculations.
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Using data for the last year of our sample, 1992, we apply equation (4) to calculate the extra
domestic output per foreign job.  This quantity ∆YI
d/∆NI
f varies by industry:  we estimated γ1 to
be the same across industries, but each industry has different values of the other three
components of the right-hand side of (4).  Averaging our calculations across all industries, we
                                                                                                                                                                          
32 We converted U.S. dollars to U.K. pounds using market exchange rates, and then converted all values into 2000 prices using
the U.K. GDP deflator.
33  If spillovers truly operated along both industry and region lines, then a new foreign plant would necessarily stimulate
spillovers along both lines.  Our industry calculations ignore regional effects, consistent with the evidence in Tables 3 through 6.26
obtain an average value of ∆YI 
d/∆NI 
f  of £2,097 in 1992 prices.  This figure says that, ceteris
paribus, each new foreign worker stimulates an extra £2,097 in output across all domestic plants
in that worker’s industry.  This amount is about £2,440 at 2000 prices.
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We can now compare our calculations of subsidy costs and benefits.  To do this, we need to
remember that the subsidy benefits accrue per year, and accordingly measure costs and benefits
over the same time spans.  For the two U.S. cases, note that we are assuming that our estimates
of U.K. productivity spillovers apply in the same way to the United States.  We have no way to
evaluate this assumption, but maintain it simply for the sake of discussion.
The U.K. Siemens plant stayed open 18 months.  At a discount rate of 5%, £2,440 for 18
months is £3,430:  this is the value of spillover benefits per worker at this plant.  The subsidy
cost £35,417 per worker, an order of magnitude more than our best guess as to its spillover
benefits.  The U.K. Motorola plant survived 10 years.  At a discount rate of 5%, this translates
into a present-value spillover benefits of £18,841 per worker.  The subsidy cost £14,356 per
worker, so in this case the government cost of the subsidy was about equal to its estimated
productivity benefits.
The two U.S. cases are harder to judge, both because of the spillover caveat mentioned above
and because the plants remain open today.  The Toyota plant opened in 1988, and so thus far has
generated a present-value spillover benefit of £22,920 per worker.  The subsidy cost per worker
is £39,827 in this case.  This amount would be the present value of spillover benefits if the plant
operates for 35 years, suggesting the Toyota plant must remain open 22 more years to “break
even.”  The Mercedes plant opened in 1994, with an implied spillover benefit of £14,119 for its
seven years of operation.  This is an order of magnitude smaller than our calculated subsidy cost
per worker of £117,178, which suggests that for this case the subsidy cost will exceed its
productivity-spillover benefits.
A number of comments regarding these calculations are worth making.  The first and most
important is to reiterate that these calculations are only suggestive, as they rely on many
assumptions and caveats.  In particular, we have not considered benefits to foreign presence
beyond the single issue of productivity spillovers.  Foreign plants may bring benefits we have not
                                                                                                                                                                          
Alternatively, once could assume that industries and their owners are distributed evenly throughout regions, so that any new
foreign plant would have a negligible impact on FORR.
34 As a benchmark, in 1992 gross output per domestic worker averaged about £73,000, with domestic wages averaging about
£15,000.27
considered (e.g., civic benefits of “good citizen” employers).  We also have not specified from
where new foreign employees come.  A new employee at a foreign plant may come from abroad,
or from employment in a different domestic plant, or from unemployment.  In the last case, the
social value of the new foreign job may be higher.
A second comment is to stress the ceteris paribus nature of these calculations.  For a foreign
plant to continue generating spillovers over time, it needs to maintain its boost to the foreign-
affiliate share of its industry employment.  It is not length of plant life that is at issue, strictly
speaking, but rather the length of increase in foreign-affiliate employment share.  These
calculations assume no other growth or decline in employment among all other plants.  In reality,
this may not be the case.  For example, if over time spillovers stimulate hiring at domestic plants,
then a foreign plant’s boost to the foreign-affiliate employment share declines over time.
A final consideration is the incidence of subsidy costs and benefits.  In the four cases we
considered, host-country governments directly pay the subsidy costs.  But these governments do
not directly realize the subsidy benefits.  Productivity spillovers accrue to domestic firms, not
domestic governments.  In principle, subsidies could be paid by coalitions of domestic firms that
organize to pool contributions used as incentives to foreign firms.  In practice, the standard
collective-action problem of free riding may make such coalition-forming difficult.
Governments may be willing to pay subsidy costs based on the tax revenues they gain from
the domestic-output boost.  But if governments care only about their tax-revenue gain, then the
cost they should be willing to incur equals just their share of the output bonus.  In 1992 the
maximum corporate tax rates were 33% in the United Kingdom and 34% in the United States.
This means that spillover benefits accruing to governments are only about 1/3 the total benefits
calculated above, which makes the cost-benefit calculations even more unfavorable.
Alternatively, governments might care about more than their tax-revenue gain, and thus may
somehow internalize the spillover benefits enjoyed by domestic firms.
35
6.  Conclusions
A large number of countries pay subsidies to attract FDI.  One justification is that the social
returns to FDI exceed the private returns, because of productivity spillovers from FDI to
                                                     
35 If part of the subsidy package governments offer is tax breaks, then the relevant effective tax rates are even lower.  Courant
(1994) surveys how to evaluate tax policy when used to foster economic development.28
domestic firms.  In this paper we therefore examined two issues.  First, are there productivity
spillovers from FDI to domestic firms? Second, if there are such spillovers, what level of
subsidies would be justified?  Using a plant-level panel for U.K. manufacturing covering 1973-
1992, we estimated production functions for domestic plants augmented with terms measuring
foreign presence in the industry and region.  Our major findings are as follows.
(a) We estimate a significantly positive correlation between a domestic plant’s TFP and
the foreign share of employment in that plant’s industry.  Typical estimates suggest
that a 10 percentage-point increase in foreign presence in a U.K. industry raises the
TFP of that industry’s domestic plants by about 0.5 percent.  This correlation is
consistent with productivity spillovers from inward FDI to domestic plants.  We do
not find significant effects for foreign share of employment by region.  Our estimates
are robust across several issues regarding measurement and specification.
(b) These estimates suggest that the per-job value of spillovers appear to be less than per-
job incentives governments have granted in recent high-profile cases, in some cases
several times less.
We have also found some evidence that spillovers take time to permeate to domestic plants,
that they are more important for plants at the lower end of the performance distribution, and that
they are the largest from U.S.- and French-owned plants.
Ours is the first micro-level study we are aware of to find broad evidence of FDI spillovers.
In future work there are at least two additional questions we plan to investigate.  One important
issue is the channels of productivity spillovers—e.g., access to suppliers, labor-market turnover.
Another is whether different modes of FDI activity—greenfield investments, acquisitions of
British firms, expansions of existing affiliates—have different impacts on domestic producers.29
Data Appendix
Variable Definitions and Sources
∆lnYt The log change in total manufacturing real gross output (£s in 1980) (direct from
ARD), deflated by 4 digit annual output price deflators supplied by the ONS.
∆lnKt The log change in total manufacturing real net capital stock (£s in 1980).  Capital
stock is estimated from establishment level investment in plant and machinery,
vehicles and buildings, using perpetual inventory methods with the starting values
and depreciation rates taken from O’Mahony and Oulton (1990) using the selected
sample only.  Depreciation rates: buildings 2.91%, plant and machinery 11.097%,
and vehicles 28.1%.  Buildings and plant and machinery are deflated by two digit
industry deflators, vehicles by annual deflators.  Deflators were supplied, by
Rachel Griffiths at IFS.  In addition, establishments may disappear and appear
from the ARD  data due to sampling.  This clearly creates problems for the
perpetual inventory method.  If we drop all establishments that disappear and
reappear for at least one year we lose almost 50% of our selected sample.  To fill
in the missing year’s investment data, we multiplied that year’s industry
investment by the establishment’s average share of industry investment over the
establishment’s lifetime.  After some experimentation we used this method to
interpolate for establishments with at most three year’s missing data.  This means
we only lose 10% of the sample.  Although investment is of course volatile,
establishments’ investment shares by industry are in fact extremely stable and so
we feel the induced inaccuracies are likely to be small relative to very large gain
in sample size.
∆lnLt The log change in total manufacturing employment (direct from ARD).
∆lnSt The log change in total manufacturing non-manual employment (direct from
ARD).
∆lnUt The log change in total manufacturing manual employment (direct from ARD).
∆lnMt The log change in total manufacturing real intermediate inputs (£s in 1980) (direct
from ARD), deflated by four digit input price deflators supplied by the ONS.
∆MSHAREit-2. The lagged change in market share, (t-2)-(t-3) .  The market share is establishment
nominal gross output as a share of four digit industry nominal gross output.
RENTSit-2. Rents lagged twice.  It is defined as rents over net output, where rents are net
output less material, capital and labour costs, expressed as a proportion of net
output.  Labour costs are the region- and four digit industry specific average
manual and non-manual wage.
∆RENTSit-2. The lagged change in rents, (t-2)-(t-3).
∆FORIt The change in employment in a foreign-owned plant as a share of total
employment in the industry.  Industry is defined at the two-digit level, there are
22 two-digit industries.
∆FORRt The change in employment in a foreign-owned plant as a share of total
employment in the region.  There are 11 standard regions in the United Kingdom.30
Appendix:  Payments to Foreign Firms Operating in the United Kingdom
The U.K. Government supports firms in many ways.
36  EU legislation restricts such support to
special cases, such as investment that can be shown to be of social benefit in low-income areas
designated by the EU as Assisted Areas.  There are thus two main sources of support which are
available in these areas.
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1.  EU money from the European Structural funds.  This money is mostly paid out to large
infrastructure projects.
2.  Money from the U.K. government.  These are discretionary grants made to support both
small (i.e., less than £500,000) and large (i.e., above £500,000) private investment projects.
Most funding for foreign investment is for larger projects, and comes from Regional Selective
Assistance (RSA).  The projects must either create new employment or safeguard existing
employment in the Assisted Areas.  To be eligible for RSA, before investment goes ahead
applicants have to disclose the investment size as well as its expected employment creation and
duration.  Foreign companies are eligible for RSA for greenfield investments as well as
expansions or modernizations of existing operations.  RSA is available for up to 15% of eligible
project costs (mostly the costs of capital investment).
A government official judges whether an RSA-applied investment will create jobs and for how
long.  It is difficult to assess exactly how this judgement is made.  An indication of the process
involved is given by the following excerpt from the standard RSA application form; it states that
all of the listed criteria must be met for the grant application to be considered.
The project:
Takes place in an Assisted Area.
Is aimed at more than a local market.
Is based on forecast growth in the market sector to ensure that displacement is not an issue.
Will involve a minimum capital expenditure of £500,000 on fixed assets.
Will directly create or safeguarded job in the business.
Expects the business as a whole to be financially viable and profitable within three years.
If the project is undertaken by a member of a group, the group will be financially stable.
Needs RSA as essential for the project to proceed.
                                                     
36 For more information see www.Invest-in-the-UK.com.  General information about grants is at www.dti.gov.uk/support and
www.invest.uk.com. See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/business/the_company_file/newsid_332000/332560.stm> for
information on the Siemens case and <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/scotland/newsid_1294000/1294662.stm> for
information on the Motorola case.
37 Assisted Areas are designated as Tier 1, 2, or 3 depending on their deprivation level.  U.K. examples of Tier 1, i.e., poorest,
areas are the Sheffield and Liverpool areas.31
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1973 21,413 20,418 995 0.12
1974 23,486 22,333 1,153 0.13
1975 21,798 20,665 1,133 0.13
1976 21,820 20,582 1,238 0.14
1977 21,860 20,363 1,497 0.16
1978 18,823 17,426 1,397 0.15
1979 17,965 16,441 1,524 0.16
1980 14,901 13,432 1,469 0.17
1981 14,717 13,155 1,562 0.18
1982 14,468 12,920 1,548 0.18
1983 14,046 12,493 1,553 0.17
1984 18,352 16,793 1,559 0.17
1985 13,783 12,416 1,367 0.17
1986 13,192 11,927 1,265 0.16
1987 13,316 12,026 1,290 0.16
1988 13,460 12,161 1,299 0.16
1989 18,982 17,370 1,612 0.18
1990 14,036 12,544 1,492 0.20
1991 13,926 12,319 1,607 0.22
1992 13,449 11,826 1,623 0.23
Note:  In each year, a foreign-owned plant is defined as one in which a foreign business entity has at
least a 20% ownership stake.  All plants not meeting this criterion are defined as British owned.  The
employment shares in the final column report the share of overall U.K. manufacturing employment
accounted for by foreign-owned plants.  The sample of plants used for each year is the entire ARD
selected sample, unweighted.  See text for details on ownership and sampling issues.35
Table 2a:  Share of Foreign Employment, by Region
Region 1977 1992
South East 0.26 0.22
East Anglia 0.23 0.21
South West 0.12 0.14
West Midlands 0.08 0.17
East Midlands 0.08 0.11
Yorkshire /Humberside 0.11 0.13




N. Ireland 0.22 0.21
Note:  Each cell reports the share of that region-year’s total manufacturing employment
accounted for by foreign-owned plants.  The sample of plants used for each year is the entire
ARD selected sample, unweighted.  See text for details on sampling issues.
Table 2b:  Share of Foreign Employment, by Industry
Two-digit industry 1977 1992
21 Extraction and preparation of metalliferous ores  0.00  0.00
22 Metal manufacturing 0.05 0.16
23 Extraction of minerals not elsewhere specified 0.02 0.00
24 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 0.11 0.11
25 Chemical industry 0.29 0.34
26 Production of man-made fibres 0.16 0.19
31 Manufacture of metal goods not elsewhere specified 0.10 0.12
32 Mechanical engineering 0.18 0.19
33 Manuf. of office machinery and data processing equipment 0.41 0.58
34 Electrical and electronic engineering 0.22 0.26
35 Manufacture of motor vehicles and parts thereof 0.34 0.43
36 Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.02 0.10
37 Instrumental engineering 0.40 0.23
41 Food and drink manufacturing industries
1 0.12 0.08
42 Food, drink and tobacco manufacturing industries
2 0.11 0.23
43 Textile industry 0.04 0.07
44 Manufacture of leather and leather goods 0.04  0.00
45 Footwear and clothing industries 0.04 0.04
46 Timber and wooden furniture industries 0.03 0.03
47 Manuf. of paper and paper products; printing and publishing 0.16 0.15
48 Processing of rubber and plastics 0.23 0.21
49 Other manufacturing industries 0.14 0.07
Note:  Each cell reports the share of that industry-year’s employment accounted for by foreign-
owned plants.  The sample of plants used for each year is the entire ARD selected sample,
unweighted.  See text for details on sampling issues.  Industries are by the U.K. Standard
Industrial Classification.
1 - Oils, margarines, milk products;  freezing, processing and preserving of meat, fish, fruit and
vegetables; grain milling, bread and flour confectionery.
2 - Sugar and sugar confectionery, cocoa, coffee, tea, animal feeds and pet foods, and all others.36
Table 3:  The Effect of Foreign-Affiliate Presence on Productivity
Baseline Specifications of Equation (2)
        1-Year Differences
(1)              (2)              (3)
          3-Year Differences
(4)              (5)              (6)
         5-Year Differences
(7)              (8)              (9)
∆FORI, t 0.049 0.052 0.053 0.086 0.053 0.022
(3.70)** (3.08)** (3.16)** (3.58)** (2.88)** (0.85)
∆FORI, t-1 -0.060 0.003 0.068
(3.42)** (0.10) (2.44)*
∆FORI, t-2 0.057 0.043 0.026 -0.005 0.052 0.013
(3.39)** (2.31)* (1.14) (0.17) (1.95) (0.45)
∆FORI, t-3 -0.006 -0.028 0.030 0.079 0.011 0.010
(0.39) (1.68) (1.33) (3.01)** (0.40) (0.37)
∆FORR, t 0.004 0.015 -0.011 0.044 -0.018 -0.035
(0.23) (0.71) (0.45) (1.25) (0.56) (0.91)
∆FORR, t-1 0.006 0.002 -0.020
(0.25) (0.05) (0.46)
∆FORR, t-2 0.026 0.030 -0.076 -0.089 0.001 0.019
(1.25) (1.30) (2.34)* (2.35)* (0.03) (0.43)
∆FORR, t-3 0.029 0.029 0.075 0.103 0.036 0.034
(1.28) (1.24) (2.28)* (2.71)** (0.82) (0.77)
Σ FORI 0.049 0.051 0.007 0.053 0.056 0.163 0.053 0.063 0.113
P (ind) 0.0009 0.0000 0.0491 0.0003 0.0467 0.0067
Σ FORR 0.004 0.055 0.080 -0.011 -0.001 0.060 -0.018 0.037 -0.002
P (reg) 0.3026 0.5544 0.0228 0.0452 0.6635 0.6848
Observations 74,615 54,481 54,481 57,057 40,485 40,485 35,260 26,287 26,287
R-squared 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.76 0.76 0.76
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.  The rows Σ FORI  and Σ FORR
report the sum of the relevant coefficient estimates in that column; P(ind) and P(reg) report the p-value for testing the joint
significance of the relevant estimates.  The dependent variable is the difference of the log real output.  Other regressors are the
differenced logs of capital, materials, skilled employment, unskilled employment and hours, year dummies, 20 two-digit industry
dummies, 10 region dummies and competition control variables.  For brevity, these coefficient estimates are not reported.37
Table 4:  The Effect of Foreign-Affiliate Presence on Productivity
Specifications of Equation (2) By Absorptive Capacity
Employment within
each two digit industry/year
TFP within
each two digit industry/year
Skill intensity within




























∆FORI, t 0.074 0.053 0.027 0.059 0.033 0.022 0.062 0.070 -0.009
(1.75) (3.08)** (1.17) (1.95) (1.75) (0.88) (2.31)* (4.03)** (0.29)
∆FORR, t 0.054 -0.014 0.000 0.004 0.033 -0.047 -0.008 0.000 0.033
(1.08) (0.60) (0.01) (0.12) (1.38) (1.31) (0.24) (0.00) (0.89)
Observations 10,143 40,965 23,507 16,284 34,350 23,981 18,059 39,214 17,342
R-squared 0.51 0.58 0.57 0.60 0.60 0.51 0.56 0.58 0.54
Note:  Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.  The percentiles use the
average employment, TFP and skill share in years (t-1) and (t-2) in the corresponding two digit industry.  Skill intensity
is the share of skilled employment over total employment.  The dependent variable is the difference of the log real
output.  Other regressors are the differenced logs of capital, materials, skilled employment, unskilled employment and
hours as described in appendix, year dummies, 20 two-digit industry dummies, 10 region dummies and competition
control variables.  For brevity, these coefficient estimates are not reported.
Table 5:  The Effect of Foreign-Affiliate Presence on Productivity























Note:  Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%
level; ** significant at 1% level.  The dependent variable is
the difference of the log real output.  Other regressors are the
differenced logs of capital, materials, skilled employment,
unskilled employment and hours as described in appendix,
year dummies, 20 two-digit industry dummies, 10 region
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